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MULTIPLE CORRELATION OF
JUDICIAL BACKGROUNDS AND DECISIONS
STUART S. NAGEL*
I. THE BASIC RESEARCH DESIGN
In the early 1960's this writer published a series of articles describ-
ing the relation between the backgrounds of judges and judicial de-
cisional propensities." The basic research design used for this project
was divided into three components. The first step was to establish a
number of hypotheses, for example: if judges possess a particular back-
ground characteristic, then it may be possible to predict that they also
generally possess a specific decisional propensity.2 Next, the hypotheses
were tested through compilation and analysis of data supplied from
carefully selected sources.3 The data sources for this analysis were the
judicial decisions and background characteristics of the judges on
every state supreme court that was bi-group with respect to the back-
ground characteristic under investigation; 4 compilations were based
on all the nonunanimous decisions reached by these courts during
their 1955 term.5 After statistical analysis of the data, conclusions about
the presence and strength of the proposed relationship could be drawn.6
One relation investigated during this period was that hypothesized
to exist between political party affiliation and a propensity to favor the
* Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois. B.A., Northwestern University,
1957, J.D., 1958, Ph.D., 1961.
1. See Nagel, Off-the-Bench Judicial Attitudes, in JUDICAL DECISIoN-MAKING 29 (G.
Shubert ed. 1963); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL.
Scr. REV. 843 (1961); Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CraM.
L.C. & P.S. 333 (1962); Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities, 24 J. POL. 92
(1962); Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-
Making, 15 W. POL. Q. 425 (1962).
2. See S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 14 (1969).
3. See id. 15-20.
4. The background characteristics used were defined so that a judge would belong
to one of two categories. For a discussion of the problems encountered in positioning
the judges, see Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial
Decision-Making, 15 W. POL. Q. 425, 428-30 (1962). A court was bi-group with respect to a
background characteristic (such as political party) if it had at least one member includ-
ed in each category (that is, at least one Democrat and one Republican). To under-
stand why it was necessary to restrict the sample to bi-group courts, see note 17 and
accompanying text infra.
5. Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-
Making, 15 W. POL. Q. 425 (1962), gives more detailed information about the methods
used to gather and analyze the data for this early research. The year 1955 was the
only year for which the valuable Directory of American Judges was published. The
time period used is referred to in this article as a possible explanatory variable where
it may be relevant, although the general findings do not appear to be time-bound.
6. S. NAGEL, supra note 2. at 20-23.
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defense in criminal cases. The specific hypothesis used was: "Demo-
cratic judges have a greater tendency to decide for the defense in
criminal cases than do Republican judges. '' 7 To test the hypothesis,
it was necessary to compare: (1) the percentage of Democratic judges
(the +X position) who decided for the defense in criminal cases more
often than their supreme court did (the +Y position) with (2) the per-
centage of Republican judges (the -X position) who decided for the
defense more often than their supreme court did (the + Y position) .8
The conclusion drawn from these comparisons was that, compared
to other background characteristics, political party affiliation is a re-
latively accurate predictor of decisional propensities among state su-
preme court judges hearing criminal cases.
Some reviewers of this early research indicated that determining
the relations between two or more background characteristics and two
or more decisional propensities simultaneously could lead to addi-
tional insights about the relation between a judge's background and
the judicial rulings he made." The purpose of this article is to provide
such a multiple correlation analysis of judges' backgrounds and de-
cisions.' 0
7. Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-
Making, 15 W. POL. Q. 425, 427 (1962).
8. Because it is used here to predict the presence of a decisional propensity, political
party affiliation is called an independent variable. The letter X is usually used to
represent such a variable. Since the propensity to favor the defense is the behavior
to be predicted, it is regarded as the dependent variable. The letter Y usually denotes
the dependent variable. In this case each usable member of the sample set can assume
only one of two possible positions with respect to each variable: either a judge is a
Democrat or he is a Republican; either he finds for the defense in criminal cases
more often than his supreme court or he does not. Arbitrarily, one position with
respect to the independent variable X will be considered positive (denoted +X) and the
other position negative (denoted -X). In the same way, one position with respect to
the dependent variable is considered positive and the other negative.
The results of the data collection can be summarized in a four-cell table that can be
used later to compute a statistical measure of the strength of the hypothesized relationship.
See note 14 infra.
9. H. GLICK & K. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 82-84 (1973); W. MURPHY & J. TANEN-
HAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 103-11 (1972); Grossman, Social Backgrounds and
Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966); Grossman, Social Backgrounds
and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory, 29 J. POL. 334 (1967). Some aspects of
Grossman's articles were questioned in Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes, and the Voting
Behavior of Judges: A Comment on Joel Grossman's "Social Backgrounds and Judicial
Decisions," 31 J. POL. 214 (1969). Grossman responded in Further Thoughts on Con-
sensus and Conversion: A Reply to Professor Goldman, 31 J. POL. 223 (1969).
10. The IBM card data and coding key from which all the calculations in this
article are made are available on request from this writer or from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political Research at Ann Arbor. Tables showing the names of the
judges, their backgrounds, their decisional propensities and the citations to the cases
used are available in Nagel, Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making (un-
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A. Some Problems in the Original Research Design
The original research design is unsuitable without modification for
multiple correlation analysis because a judge's decisional propensity
was measured by comparing his behavior with that of his court. This
was necessary to guarantee that comparison would be made only among
judges hearing the same cases at the same time."' Using the original
design to compare the decisional propensities of Catholic and Pro-
testant judges who belong to the same political party (i.e., holding
party constant) would require finding at least one state supreme court
whose members included Catholic Democrats, Catholic Republicans,
Protestant Democrats and Protestant Republicans. One would then
compare (1) the percentage of Catholic Democratic judges whose de-
cisions for the defense in criminal cases exceeded the average of their
state supreme court with (2) the percentage of Protestant Democratic
judges who decided for the defense more often than did their court.
One would repeat this procedure for Catholic Republican judges and
Protestant Republican judges.
To evaluate the combined effect of religion and party affiliation
would require a similar comparison of Catholic Democrats, Catholic
Republicans, Protestant Democrats and Protestant Republicans. The
probability of finding a state supreme court with at least one member
published dissertation, Northwestern University Microfilms Order No. 62-865, 1961).
These materials can be used for checking the calculations or for secondary analysis.
11. Failure to control for these important case determinants when comparing
judges can easily lead to spurious results. For example, Glendon Schubert compares
Northern trial judges with Southern trial judges in union-management cases later
heard by the United States Supreme Court, and he finds the Southern trial judges
decided in favor of the union about the same percentage of times as did the Northern
judges. G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 458 (1964).
Southern union-management cases, however, may be much easier to decide in favor of
the union, given the possibly more clear-cut violations of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act by Southern employers. See R. Downing, The Federal Courts and Labor Re-
lations Policy, 1936-1954: A Study of Judicial Decision-Making (unpublished dissertation
in University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library, 1956).
The meaning of findings in other studies is also weakened because the authors did
not account for differences in the cases heard by different groups of judges. See, e.g., D.
Bowen, The Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociological Characteristics
of Judges (unpublished dissertation in Yale University Library, 1965); Goldman, Voting
Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 374
(1966); Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 14 TORONTO L.J. 194 (1962). Richard Schwartz, how-
ever, has clearly indicated his awareness of this comparability problem. Schwartz, judicial
Objectivity and Quantitative Analysis, in 1963 MODERN USES OF LOGIC IN LAW 141-42.
See also R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 311 (1969);
Sacks, Book Review, 67 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 221 (1973) (reviewing GLICK, SUPREME COURTS
IN STATE PoLrrICs (1971)).
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in each of these four categories is very small. 12 If one wishes to assess
the combined effect of more than two background variables, the op-
portunity to make the necessary comparisons becomes even less likely.13
B. Modifications to Allow Multiple Correlation Analysis
As an alternative research design, one can first determine the cor-
relation between each background characteristic, X, and the judges'
decisional propensities in criminal cases, Y. To do this requires one to
introduce the statistical concept of the correlation coefficient, denoted
r". 4 This coefficient may assume any value between +1.00 and -1.00.
The closer r, is to +1.00, the stronger the positive relationship be-
tween X and Y; the closer r, is to -1.00, the stronger the negative re-
12. The average number of members of a state supreme court is seven; among its
seven members, a court is not likely to have at least one judge belonging to each of
these four categories.
13. This kind of partitioning or fractionization approach to the problem of partial
and multiple correlation was used with regulatory agency commissioners in Nagel &
Lubin, Regulatory Commissioners and Party Politics, 17 ADMIN. L. REV. 39 (1964). That
research, however, did not require that all usable agencies have all the categories of
commissioners being compared, although the research did use being above or below
the decisional average of one's agency in a liberal direction as the decisional variable.
14. See J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 135 (3d
ed. 1956).
For the general formula to compute r, see P. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTIcS 165 (3d ed. 1962). Because each variable discussed in this article assumes only
one of two values, however, the computation of r., can be greatly simplified. To evaluate
rxV in the special case, the following steps suffice. Step 1. Construction of a four-cell
illustrating the distribution of the data collected:
-Y +Y
+x A B
-X C D
This table indicates that (1) in A cases, the +X and -Y positions were taken, (2) in
B cases, the +X and +Y positions were taken, (3) in C cases, the -X and -Y positions
were taken, and (4) in D cases, the -X and +Y positions were taken.
Step 2. Then rr can be computed using the formula:
BC-AD
V (A+B) (C+D) (A-+C) (B+D)
S. NACEL, THE LEGAL PROCEsS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 128 (1969).
Data collected by this author can now be used to compute the correlation coefficient
between political party affiliation and a tendency to favor the defense in criminal
cases (the first entry in the first column of Table 1, pp. 266-67 infra).
The four-cell constructed from the data looks like this:
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lationship between X and Y.15 The closer r., is to 0.00 in value, the
weaker the relationship is between X and Y.1.
The sources used in the original design can again supply the
necessary data to compute each correlation coefficient. Only bi-group
courts are used because religion, party or any other background
At or below the average
of one's court on the Above the average of one's Totals
decision score* court on the decision score
Democratic
Judges
Republican
Judges
*Decision score represents the proportion of times voting for the defense in
criminal cases. Unanimous cases were excluded, since they have no bearing on
the direction of the position of judges relative to other judges sitting on the
same court.
Id. at 190.
In this example,
A=18 B=22
C=31 D=14
Substituting these numbers in the formula for r.., one sees that
(22 x 31)- (14 x 18) =.24
(18+22) (31+14) (18+31) (22+14)
There is a "rule-of-thumb" that can be used to estimate r in the cases considered
here:
When both the [independent] predictor variable and the [dependent] outcome
variable provide for only two categories . . . the correlation coefficient is ap-
proximately [see note 33 infra] equal to (1) the percentage of cases positive on the
predictor variable that are also positive on the outcome variable minus (2) the
percentage of cases negative on the predictor variable that are positive on the
outcome variable.
Id. at 147.
15. H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 377 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL
STATISTICS]. The reader must remember:
The interpretation of a correlation coefficient as a measure of the strength
of the .. .relationship between two variables is a purely mathematical interpre-
tation and is completely devoid of any cause or effect implications. The fact that
two variables tend to increase or decrease together does not imply that one has
any direct or indirect effect on the other.
P. HoEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 164 (3d ed. 1962) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., the example illustrating this warning, id. at 164-65.
16. SOCIAL STATISTICS 377. r /=_0, however, does not imply that there is no relation-
ship between the variables since r5, may only be measuring the linear relation and a
non-linear relation may be present. See P. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATIs-
TICS 377-78 (3d ed. 1962).
18 22(55% of 40)
31 14(31% of 45)
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characteristic cannot explain differences in the decisions of members
of the same court if the members of the court all share or all fail to
share the background characteristic under study.'7  Only cases de-
cided nonunanimously are used because these are the only cases
in which there are differences to explain. The size of the sample from
which each correlation is determined will vary because the number
of judges serving in 1955 on bi-group courts depends upon the back-
ground characteristic being studied-in other words, upon the number
of +X and -X judges who are members of each court that has at
least one +X and at least one -X judge.'
As the next step, one can place these correlation coefficients in a
correlation matrix 9 from which a multiple correlation analysis2 0 or
a multiple regression analysis2' can be completed. Forming the matrix
requires the assumption that the number of judges upon which each
correlation is based (denoted N) is in some sense a representative
sample of the set of judges upon which each correlation could have
been based. Assuming that the sample 22 used is representative of the
population 23 from which it was drawn is less reasonable when, as here,
membership in the sample set is not randomly determined.24 When
one interprets the results, however, he can allow for the possibility
that a group of judges is not randomly representative of the whole.
17. When this writer used judges serving on one-party courts in the correlation of
political party and decisions, the correlation dropped greatly although the sample
sizes increased since more judges could become members of the sample. Similarly
lowered correlations were observed when the writer used judges serving on courts that
were homogeneous with regard to other background characteristics being correlated.
18. See notes 4 & 8 supra.
19. The correlation matrix for the 14 background characteristics is a rectangular
array of 14 rows and 14 columns. The entry in column j, row i is the correlation co-
efficient relating the ith independent variable X, to the 'th independent variable XF See
SOCIAL STATISTICS 386-87 (1st ed. 1960).
20. See notes 53-63 and accompanying text infra, discussing multiple correlation
analysis.
21. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text infra, discussing multiple regression
analysis.
22. The statistical term "sample" refers to the subset of the "population" (see
note 23 infra) contributing the data on which the statistical computations are based
and from which statistical inferences are drawn. P. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 64 (3d ed. 1962).
23. The statistical term "population" refers to the totality of all possible contributors
of data for a statistical investigation; a specific population is always defined by naming
its unique properties. See J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDU-
CATION 155 (3d ed. 1956).
24. A sample is randomly determined if "every individual in the population has
an equal chance of being chosen [as a member of the sample]. The selection of any one
individual is also in no way tied to the selection of any other." Id. at 156. The problems
caused by using a sample that was not randomly selected are discussed in id. at 157-58;
SOCIAL STATISTICS 142-45, 523-24.
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For example, if Democratic judges are found to be more liberal 25
than Republican judges, one could observe that only northern courts
were bipartisan. One would then realize that northern Democrats
are being compared with northern Republicans because the bi-group
or bipartisan criterion of the sample set prevents any comparison be-
tween southern Democrats and northern Republicans hearing the
same cases on the same court.26
II. THE NON-MULTIPLE CORRELATION RESULTS
The main results this writer obtained from such a multiple correla-
tion analysis of judicial characteristics and decisions are exhibited in
Table 1. The twelve background variables and two attitudinal
variables used in this writer's prior research appear again for two
reasons: (1) to establish continuity between the present and earlier
research and (2) to take advantage of the predictive power of the
previous background variables. 27 The background variables studied
include political party affiliation, pressure group affiliation, ethnic
affiliation, pre-judicial occupation, education, age, and size of home-
town.28 The only change made in the set of background variables has
been the substitution of the variable of economic liberalism 2 for the
variable of liberalism, primarily because the latter lacked the clarity
and specificity needed to do a more meaningful analysis.8 0
25. The term "liberal" in this context corresponds to "the viewpoint associated
with the interests of the lower or less privileged economic or social groups in one's society
and (to a less extent) with acceptance of long-run social change." Nagel, Political Party
Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 843, 846 (1961).
26. In an unpublished review dated May 26, 1973, of this manuscript and the
multiple correlation methods which it uses, Robert Ferber (an editor of the Journal
of the American Statistical Association) wrote: "I do not have any major comments on
how to improve the goodness of fit . . . .All things considered, I think you have done
as much as you could do with these data."
27. For more detailed information about these background characteristics, see Nagel,
Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 333 (1962).
28. The number of variables could be increased by inserting into the regression
equation (see notes 68-70 infra) variables that represent (1) the squares or exponents
of certain of the 14 variables if non-linear relations were suspected and (2) the product
of certain pairs of the 14 variables if joint interaction effects on the dependent variable
were suspected. See SOCIAL STATSTIcs 459-64, 502-06. Similarly, the number of variables
could be decreased (thereby reducing the multicollinearity or intercorrelations among
them) by constructing a single score for a related block of variables within the 14
variables. See id. at 457, 503.
29. See note 25 supra.
30. The statement in the mailed questionnaire used to measure the economic
liberalism attitude read, "Present laws favor the rich as against the poor." Judges were
asked whether they strongly agreed, mildly agreed, had no opinion, mildly disagreed
or strongly disagreed with this statement. The statement used to measure a liberal atti-
tude towards treatment of criminals was, "Our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we
JUDICIAL BACKGROUNDS
The two dependent variables examined here are both decisional
propensities. The first is the tendency of a judge to decide for the
defense in criminal cases more often than does his state supreme court.
Since all the cases examined were decided by a state supreme court,
the issues emphasized were legal rather than factual; that is, the issues
presented were often procedural or constitutional questions of law
rather than trial-level determinations of fact.
The second dependent variable reflects the tendency of a judge
to find more often than his state supreme court: (1) for the adminis-
trative agency in business regulation cases; (2) for the claimant in
unemployment compensation cases; (3) for the tenant in landlord-
tenant cases; (4) for the debtor in creditor-debtor cases; (5) for the
consumer in sale-of-goods cases; (6) for the injured party in motor
vehicle accident cases; (7) for the labor union in union-management
cases; and (8) for the employee in employee injury cases. Calculating
a judge's position with respect to this second dependent variable re-
quires computation of a composite decision score for each judge. To
obtain this composite score, the decision scores of each judge for each
of these eight categories of cases were added together and then the
sum was divided by the number of categories for which he received a
score. 31 Thus each judge was assigned a score indicating that his be-
havior in economic cases was more or less liberal than that of his
court.32
Table 1 is divided into two parts, with data for the criminal
cases in the first three columns and the data for the economic cases
in the last three columns. In both parts, the first data column lists
the one-to-one (or zero-order3 .1) correlation coefficients between each
should try to cure, not to punish them." For more information about the questionnaire,
see S. NAGEL, Judicial Attitudes and Those of Legislators and Administrators, in THE
LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECrIVE 199 (1969); Nagel, Off-the-Bench Judicial
Attitudes, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 29 (G. Schubert ed. 1963). The response rate
was as follows: 139 judges replied to the questionnaire (with 118 usable replies), 136
failed to reply, and 38 were known to have died before the questionnaires were mailed.
In the correlation and regression analysis used to generate Table 1, the two attitude
variables were each coded with five categories or degrees, and the twelve background
variables were coded as dichotomous.
31. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. POL. Sci. REV.
843, 844 (1961), describes how the decision score for each category would be computed.
32. See note 25 supra.
33. The zero-order correlation coefficient is defined in note 8 supra. This coefficient
is computed without recognition of the possible effect of other intervening variables.
When these effects are recognized, multiple correlation techniques must be used to
measure the correlation between any two variables. If the effect of n other variables is
statistically controlled, the correlation coefficient relating two variables is called an nth
order partial correlation coefficient.
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background characteristic and a judge's tendency to find for the de-
fense in criminal cases more often than did his state supreme court.
The second column shows the size of the sample34 of judges who
supplied data to compute these correlation coefficients. Judges are
included in a sample only if (1) they serve on courts that are bi-group s5
with respect to an independent background variable; (2) they have
heard cases involving the dependent variable issue; and (3) they
reached a nonunanimous decision in at least one of these cases.
All the background characteristics can assume only one of two
values; they are described so that the category hypothesized to be
more liberal36 is mentioned first. A positive entry in the first and
fourth data columns indicates support for the general hypothesis
that there is a correlation between the liberal background characteris-
tics and finding for the defense in criminal cases and for the generally
economically weaker party in the civil cases considered. The table
shows that political party affiliation is a relatively good predictor of
a judge's vote in both criminal cases and civil cases involving economic
issues.37 Religious affiliation is also an indicator of judicial behavior
The correlations in the first column of Table 1 do not correspond exactly to the
differences between percentages shown in Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal
Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 333, 335 (1962), because rov is not exactly equal to the
difference between the percentage of +X judges who are +Y and the percentage of
-X judges who are +Y. See Nagel, Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction,
42 TEXAS L. REv. 1006, 1009-10 (1964); notes 4 & 8 supra. The substantial deviation with
regard to the education variable is explained by a typographical error in the earlier
article.
34. See note 22 supra.
35. See note 4 supra.
36. See note 25 supra.
37. Other research that finds Democratic judges differing from Republican judges
includes the following: J. Beatty, An Institutional and Behavioral Analysis of the Iowa
Supreme Court-1965-1969 (unpublished dissertation in University of Iowa Library,
1970); M. Feeley, A Comparative Analysis of State Supreme Court Behavior (unpublished
thesis in University of Minnesota Library, 1969); G. SCHUBERT, QUANTATVE ANALYSIS
OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 129-42 (1959); J. Herndon, Relationships Between Partisanship
and Decisions of State Supreme Courts (unpublished dissertation in University of
Michigan Library, 1963); D. Leavitt, Political Party and Class Influences on the Atti-
tudes of Justices of the Supreme Court in the Twentieth Century (unpublished paper
delivered at the 1972 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association); Barber,
Partisan Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in Ohio and Michigan, 20 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 401 (1969); Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable" in Judicial
Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4 POLITY 91 (1971);
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 374 (1966); Ulmer, Politics and Procedure in the Michigan Supreme
Court, 17 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 375 (1966); Ulmer, Leadership in the Michigan Supreme
Court, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 13 (G. Schubert ed. 1963); Ulmer, The Political
Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PUB. L. 352 (1962).
Less significant differences between the two groups of judges were found in Adamany,
The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 63 AM.
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in these situations, although it probably does not directly cause a
judge to favor the defendant or the state in a criminal case.38 There
is also a positive correlation between a judge's not having been a form-
er businessman (for example, a director, executive or proprietor) and
his support for the economic underdog.3 9
Of course, correlation alone does not indicate causation.40 One
must look beyond these correlation coefficients to prove the accuracy
of hypotheses explaining the apparent relations. Party affiliation
probably does not cause decisional propensities or liberal attitudes; it
may, however, reinforce pre-existing attitudes that are partially
responsible for a judge's choice of political party.41 Additionally, re-
POL. Sci. REV. 57 (1969); Beiser & Silberman. The Political Party Variable: Workmen's
Compensation Cases in the New York Court of Appeals, 3 POLITY 521 (1971); Walker,
A Note Concerning Partisan Influences on Trial-Judge Decision Making, 6 LAW & SOc.
REV. 645 (1972).
Although Ken Dolbeare's presentation seems to contain arithmetic errors and does
not involve judges hearing the same cases, his data show (1) that 6/17 or 35 percent
of his Democratic judges decided for the administrative action in zoning cases and (2)
that 7/23 or 30 percent of his Republican judges decided for the administrative action,
contrary to his reported findings. A similar recalculation of his data can be made with
regard to religion and zoning cases. K. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN POLITICS 77-78
(1967).
38. Works that find a difference between the decisional propensities of Catholic
and Protestant judges include: Ulmer, Dissent Behavior and the Social Background of
Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. POL. 580 (1970); Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator
to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 1947-56 Terms, 17 MIDwEST
J. POL. Scr. 622 (1973); Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the
South, 26 J. POL. 353 (1964). No significant differences were found by Chase, Green &
Mollan, Catholics on the Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 26, 1960, at 13; Goldman,
Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. Sg.
REV. 314 (1966).
39. This writer attempted to determine the relation between political party (and
other related background characteristics) and judicial propensities on the national su-
preme courts of Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, and the United Kingdom simul-
taneously, using the same within-court bivariate comparisons described here. The
general findings involved substantially lower correlations and thus apparently a lower
ideological component than with the American court data, possibly because American
courts (1) have more discretion to create judge-made law under the American common
law system; (2) have more power to nullify legislative and administrative acts under
the American judicial review system; (3) have more ideological leeway given the sub-
jectivity of such key constitutional concepts as equal protection and due process; (4)
are often elected, thus injecting partisan and ideological side effects; and (5) can
at the state supreme court level be less visible and thus less inhibited in their ideological
divisions.
40. SOCIAL STATISTICs 442-44; P. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS
164-65 (3d ed. 1962).
41. Values cause party affiliation more than party affiliation causes values, but
party affiliation and its accompanying activities can reinforce prior values. See Adamany,
The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 63 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 57 (1969); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. PoL.
Scr. REV. 843 (1961).
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ligious affiliation probably causes neither attitudes nor decisional pro-
pensities, nor is it usually a result of pre-existing attitudes. Even more
than party affiliation, religious affiliation is a consequence of social
values transmitted by the individual's family. The explanation for
the correlation probably lies in the link between particular religious
affiliations and (1) membership in distinct economic classes, (2) urban
living and (3) reaction to discrimination. A more detailed analysis of
causal relationships necessitates the investigation of correlations among
the background variables themselves. Such a study would require
statistically controlling for certain variables while allowing others
to vary within this same sample of judges.'2
There are two negative correlation coefficients of substantial mag-
nitude appearing in the first column of Table 1. These correspond
to the independent variables (1) tuition-cost of a judge's law school
education and (2) attitude on economic issues. Graduates from law
schools with low tuition (especially commuter law schools) might
be expected to be more liberal in criminal case dispositions because
students at these schools frequently come from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds. One might predict that their youthful experiences
would give these judges more empathy for the defendant in criminal
cases. Each judge in the sample, however, was a member of the state
supreme court when this data was gathered. Thus those judges who
attended law schools with low tuition experienced a form of the rags-
to-riches phenomenon. Persons from modest backgrounds who achieve
high economic status are often not particularly tolerant of those of
lower economic status.' 3 These individuals may feel that others, like
themselves, should be able to overcome a disadvantaged back-
ground. This attitude could explain partially the negative correlation
between attending a low tuition law school and being above one's
court average on propensity for the defense.
The civil liberties nature of many of the criminal cases in part may
account for the negative correlation between an attitude of economic
liberalism and partiality for the defendant. Some studies have found
positive correlations of only small magnitude or even negative cor-
relations between economic liberalism and civil-liberties liberalism,
especially among ethnic Democrats living in large cities. 4 More in-
42. See H. BLALOCK, CAUSAL INFERENCES IN NONEXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH (1964);
H. BLALOCK, CAUSAL MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1971).
43. For a discussion of the relation between wealth and conservatism, see R.
CENTERS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL CLASsES (1949); V. KEY, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 121-52 (1961); A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE & D. STOKES, The American
Voter 333-401 (1960) [hereinafter cited as A. CAMPBELL].
44. For a discussion of liberalism and ethnic Democrats, see S. LiPsKTr, POLITICAL MAN
(1960); R. SCAMMON & B. WATTENBURC, TE REAL MAJORITY (1970).
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fluential than the nature of the cases, however, is the nature of the
judges in the sample. This becomes clear when the judges are cate-
gorized according to party and religious affiliation, because these were
the two background characteristics displaying the strongest correla-
tion with decisional propensities in criminal cases (see Table 1).
Examination of the correlation matrix45 reveals that the variables of
political affiliation and of economic attitudes have a positive correla-
tion coefficient, but the correlation coefficient relating a judge's political
affiliation and his attitude toward treatment of criminals is negative.4
Similarly, the correlation coefficient relating religious affiliation
and economic attitudes is positive while the coefficient for religious
affiliation and attitude toward treatment of criminals is negative.
Thus these correlations suggest that the non-concurring correlations (1)
between political affiliation and the two attitudinal variables and (2)
between religious affiliation and the two attitudinal variables may
explain the negative correlation between liberal economic attitudes
and favoring the defense in criminal cases.
For the economic cases the only negative correlation of substantial
magnitude involved the variable of geography (see Table 1). One
could hypothesize that judges who practiced law in small towns
would assume a more conservative position in economic cases than
those who practiced in a large city. This notion is supported by the
finding that rural people, possibly because of their greater self-
sufficiency, are often less sympathetic to the liberal side in economic
cases. 47 State supreme court judges who practiced initially in large
cities, however, were more likely to be associated with firms that
practiced corporate law on behalf of the business side in economic
cases;48 judges who started their legal careers in small towns were
more often either sole practitioners or associates of firms in general
45. See note 19 supra.
46. The matrix reveals that Democratic party affiliation and liberal economic at-
titudes have a correlation coefficient of +.30 while Democratic party affiliation has a
negative correlation coefficient of -. 03 with a liberal attitude towards rehabilitation
of criminals. Being Catholic had a +.06 correlation with liberal economic attitudes and
a correlation of -. 16 with a liberal attitude towards criminal rehabilitation. The non-
concurring correlations among these four variables seem to be the key to explaining the
"inconsistency" between a judge's having liberal economic attitudes and failing to
favor the defense in criminal cases. Political affiliation and the attitudinal variables
predict the outcome in economic cases more reliably than they predict the outcome in
either civil liberties or appellate criminal cases. Nagel, Political Parties and Judicial
Review in American History, 11 J. PUB. L. 328 (1962).
47. For a discussion of the relation between urbanism and liberalism, see A. CAMP-
BELL 402-440; V. KEy, supra note 43, at 99-120.
48. See S. Nagel, Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making (unpublished
dissertation, Northwestern University Microfilms Order No, 62-865, 1961).
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practice, 49 with professional experience that more likely included
criminal defense work.
III. THE RESULTS OF MULTIPLE CORRELATION ANALYSIS
In this section the significance of the entries in the third and sixth
columns of Table 1, the columns labelled "additional variance account-
ed for," will be explained. To enable the reader to appreciate the
importance of these entries, however, it is necessary to introduce a
few more statistical concepts.
A background characteristic has "accounted for x percent of the
variance" in the decisional propensity being studied when the varia-
tion among the positions of the judges in the sample with respect to
this background characteristic can explain x percent of the variation
observed among the judges' positions with respect to the decision-
al variable.5 0 The third data column of Table 1 lists the percentage
of variance in judges' tendencies to favor the defense in criminal
cases that is accounted for by a specific background characteristic
when controlling for all the background characteristics in the table.
The sixth data column contains similar information concerning
variance in judges' tendencies to favor the economically liberal
side in certain classes of civil cases. Columns one and four, by adding
to more than 1.00 reveal some information about the overlap 5' among
the background characteristics as predictor of judicial behavior in
civil and criminal dispositions. The overlap among these independent
variables is not great enough that one can obtain a prediction of
judicial behavior with maximized accuracy by using only the back-
ground characteristic with the highest correlation coefficient.5 2 To test
the predictive power of all the independent variables interacting
with each other, one must resort to multiple correlation analysis.
A. Multiple Correlation
This term indicates the part of the total variation in the dependent
variable that can be explained by all the interacting independent
variables.5 3 One cannot simply add the correlation coefficients or the
49. See id.; data described in note 10 supra.
50. SOCIAL STATISTICS 454-55.
51. If there is a substantial correlation between two independent variables, the
second will explain essentially the same variation in the dependent variable as the
first. Therefore, to account for as much variation as possible in the dependent variable
requires that the independent variables selected have moderately high correlations
with the dependent variable and low correlation with each other. Id. at 456.
52. See note 14 supra.
53. SOCIAL STATISTICS 429.
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squares of the correlation coefficients 54 to determine how much of
the total variance the independent variables explain. Given the over-
lap in the percentage of variance for which these variables account,
such a computation could result in a sum greater than 100 percent;
this would be statistically meaningless. By using more sophisticated
multiple correlation analysis, one can eliminate the overlap in variance
explained and thus ensure that the sum of the percentages listed in
the third or the sixth column does not exceed 100 percent.
B. Computation of the Multiple Correlation Coefficient
This coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship between
a dependent variable and two or more interacting independent
variables. 55 The variance-accounted-for figures, which appear as the
last entries of columns three and six of Table 1, were obtained by
the use of a computer. A correlation matrix that showed the correla-
tions among all the background variables" supplied the input data for
the computer program. The program assumed that each correlation
was based on the same sample size. However, since the correlations
were based on samples of different sizes (see columns 2 and 5 of Table
1), some of the correlations are mathematically inconsistent with each
other. Consequently, the computer was unable to calculate the value
of standardized regression weights 7 for some of the characteristics.
These standardized regression weights are used in the computation of
both the multiple correlation coefficient and the additional variance
for which a background variable accounts. Dashes in the "variance
accounted for" columns indicate that the computer could not calculate
the weight for the corresponding variable.
Another consequence of the disparity in sample sizes was the need
to modify slightly the basic formula for calculating additional variance.
54. See note 51 supra.
55. J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 392 (3d
ed. 1956).
56. See notes 19 & 33 supra.
57. See J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 394
(3d ed. 1956). The standardized multiple regression weights are not shown because they
are useful only as intermediate mathematical values generated by canned computer pro-
grams either (1) to determine the amount of additional variance in the dependent
variable explained by each independent variable or (2) to obtain unstandardized re-
gression weights. This latter class of weights are needed to define a regression equa-
tion or formula for predicting the position of judges with respect to the dependent
variable being studied. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text infra. The unstandardized
regression weights are not shown because there is no attempt in this article to develop
a 14-variable prediction equation.
The goal here is to say something meaningful about the relative and collective im-
portance of the 14 background variables for predicting or explaining variations in the
two decisional variables.
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Failure to make the change could have resulted in a set of percentages
for which the sum exceeded 100 percent. 5 If XI, X2, . . ., X., denote
the 14 background characteristics, let B and r, be the standardized re-
gression weight and the correlation coefficient corresponding to X.
Then for each independent variable X, the basic formula to calculate
the additional variance, Vi, for which X, accounts would be:
Vi = ri Bi.
Then, if R denotes the multiple correlation coefficient,
R 2 = V, = I (riB).
That is, R 2 is the sum of the additional variances for which each in-
dependent variable X accounts.69
C. The Meaning of the Multiple Correlation Results
The third and sixth columns of Table 1 do not greatly alter the
rank order of unsigned correlation coefficients from the first and
58. If the sizes of the samples used to compute the correlation coefficient were equal,
then the additional variance explained by each independent variable would be calculated
by multiplying the correlation coefficient for each characteristic by the corresponding
standardized multiple regression weight. J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSY-
CHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 397 (3d ed. 1956). See also Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin & Rosen,
The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Ill (G. Schubert ed. 1963); Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to the Votes of
Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 1947-56 Terms, 17 MIWEST J. POL. SCI. 622
(1973). Instead of multiplying the correlation coefficient by the corresponding standardized
regression weight to determine the additional variance explained by each independent
variable, Bowen squared the partial correlation coefficient. D. Bowen, The Explanation
of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociological Characterics of Judges (unpublished
dissertation in Yale University Library, 1965). There does not seem to be any statistical
support for Bowen's method, however.
59. The basic formula for calculating the additional variance accounted for has
to be slightly modified because the basic formula may result in a set of about 14 per-
centages whose sum exceeds 100 percent. The basic formula as mentioned is the correla-
tion coefficient (symbolized r) times the standardized regression weight (symbolized B)
for each independent variable. The sum of these products should equal the multiple
correlation squared (symbolized R2) if the number of judges used in calculating each
correlation coefficient were the same. If the values shown in the third data column
are symbolized V, then the ratio of (r • B) to the sum of the (r . B)'s should be equal
to the ratio of V to R2. Thus, each V in the third data column algebraically equals
(r • B • R2) divided by the sum of the (r • B)'s. This means (where "/" is read "is to,"
and "=" is read "as') that if (r . B)/(r• B) V/R2, or if (r • B)/V =1 (r. B)/R -,
then V equals (r -B -R2) divided by Y (r • B).
The equation V = (r - B • R2)/I(r. B) using the absolute unsigned value of
r • B is more meaningful than simply saying V = r - B because r - B can be a negative
number, and the variance accounted for cannot be negative since adding any variable
increases R2 to some extent. Even without missing data, the above equation provides a
meaningful way of allocating the variance accounted for to each individual variable,
since all of the V's are positive, they all sum to R2 and they are proportional to r • V's.
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fourth data columns, respectively.-0 In most cases, those background
variables with comparatively large correlation coefficients also account-
ed for a relatively large part of the total variance explained. One
should note, however, that a background variable that has a low
correlation with one of the dependent variables may still increase the
amount of variance explained by, in effect, filtering out irrelevant
portions of other background variables with which it correlates.61
By itself each judicial characteristic cannot explain a large part of
the variance among judges' decisional propensities. For example, if
one were to rely only upon political party affiliation to predict a
judge's tendency to find for the defense in criminal cases, one could
account for only 7 percent of the variance (or .26 squared); using the
twelve variables for which standardized regression weights could be
computed, one can account for 43 percent of the variance. In fact,
one can account for 25 percent of the variance by just using the
variables of political party affiliation, attitude on economic issues and
attitude toward treatment of criminals. Column 3 of Table 1 shows
that these three variables had substantial, non-redundant correlations
with a tendency to hold for the defense in criminal cases.
The effect of multiple correlation used to interpret data collected
from judges hearing civil cases involving economic issues is more dra-
matic. Without this more sophisticated analysis, political party affilia-
tion accounts for only 14 percent of the variance.6 2 When adjustments
for the effect of other variables are made, however, political party
affiliation can account for 44 percent of the variance. If the sum of
the additional variance explained by each of the ten variables for
which the computer could find standardized regression weights (see
Table 1, column 6) is computed, approximately 90 percent of the
variance of the dependent variable can thus be explained. While cor-
relation analysis focuses upon the strength of relationships among the
60. This statement can be interpreted to mean that if the magnitude of the
correlation of X, was greater than that of X~t then X, also explained more of the
variance in the dependent variable than X t did.
61. See J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 402-03
(3d ed. 1956). The nationality of a judge's ancestors may be an example of such a filtering
or suppressor variable, since it has a low correlation with a judge's decisional pro-
pensities in economic cases, but a high correlation with political party affiliation. Its
removal from the regression equation, however, resulted in a substantial reduction in
the multiple correlation coefficient. It may exert a filtering effect by removing a portion
of the non-ideological component from the party variable because some ethnic groups
tend to join the Republican or Democratic party more from inertia and group rein-
forcement than because of the party's ideology.
62. To calculate the variance in judges' decisional propensities in economic cases
explained by party affiliation while ignoring the effect of the other variables, one must
square the correlation coefficient, .37 (see Table 1). Id. at 378.
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variables, 63 regression analysis uses the independent variables to de-
fine an equation that explains and predicts the value of the dependent
variable. 64 If one constructs a regression equation to predict a judge's
position in appropriate civil cases from the ten "usable" variables,6 5
R 2 = .90 and R = .95
imply that there will be a 68 percent reduction in the degree of error
that would result if one simply predicted that each judge would have
the average of all the scores of the total sample.
66
D. An Alternative to Multiple Correlation to Measure
Prediction Accuracy
In this paper, the writer has used the total variance explained by a
set of independent variables to measure the accuracy of these variables
for collectively predicting judicial behavior in a limited context. There
is, however, an alternative approach that is possibly more appealing
to an individual's common sense. Regression analysis may be used
to predict decisional propensity when specific values are assigned to
each of the background variables. For example, one can derive the
regression equation to predict a judge's propensity to hold for the
defense in criminal cases. Then he can apply this equation to each
judge to predict whether his decisional score will be above or below
his court's average score. A judge is labeled a misprediction if either
his actual score or the score predicted on the basis of his background
characteristics is above the court average and the other is below. The
percentage of all predictions that are mispredictions offers another
measure of accuracy of the predictions. 67 Although its meaning is
initially more difficult to comprehend, prediction accuracy measured
by the "variance-accounted-for" method should correspond reason-
ably well to that calculated by the mispredictions method.
6 8
63. SOCIAL STATISTICS 454.
64. Id. at 429-30.
65. The "usable" variables are those for which a standardized regression weight
could be calculated, that is, those variables for which a dash does not appear in column
6 of Table 1.
66. The reduction in error is the result of subtracting V1 - R2 from 1.00, where
R2 = .90. The quantity V1 - R2 is called the coefficient of alienation and indicates the
lack of relationship between the dependent and independent variables. J. GUILFORD,
FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 375 (3d ed. 1956).
67. This mispredictions method perhaps should be called the "mispostdictions" meth-
od since the events being predicted have already occurred.
68. This mispredictions method is used in Nagel, Predicting Court Cases Quantita-
tively, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1411 (1965); Ulmer, Dissent Behavior and the Social Background
of Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. POL. 580 (1970). The mispredictions method could not be
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E. Sampling Limitations Upon the Statistical Methods
Both the variance-accounted-for method and the mispredictions
method described the strength of the multiple correlation. Neither
indicates the probability that the multiple correlation coefficient
might really be zero and that chance sampling distortion69 is responsible
for the apparent magnitude of the coefficients. Statistical methods
indicate that the likelihood of obtaining a multiple correlation as
large as those obtained in Table 1, namely .66 and .95, from an average
sample size of 103 and 125 respectively is less than one in one thousand
if the multiple correlation coefficient is really zero.7 0  (Recall that
R = 0 would indicate that there was no linear relationship among
the dependent and independent variables.)7 1 One could also make
similar calculations to test the statistical significance of each correla-
tion coefficient and each additional variance explained by the back-
ground characteristics. 72 The value of performing such tests upon these
statistics, however, is questionable partly because these tests assume
that (1) the data has a normal curve distribution; (2) the variances
of all the variables are equal; and (3) the variables satisfy a linear
equation of the form Y = I (bi Xj) - a.7 3 The data collected from the
sample may fail to meet these conditions adequately. Moreover, the
sample of judges used was not randomly selected from the population
of judges; it represents the usable sample of state supreme court
judges serving in 1955 who satisfied the other requirements dis-
cussed in the preceding two sections of this article. 74 It is also true that
statistical significance depends more upon the size of the sample
than upon the magnitude of the correlation obtained.75 Finally, few
meaningfully applied to enough judges involved in Table I because it requires that
each judge be usable on each background characteristic. For more detailed information
about the mispredictions method, see Nagel, Prediction Accuracy Percentages as a Supple-
ment to Correlation Coefficients (unpublished paper available from the writer on request).
69. See SOCIAL STATISTICS 523-24; note 24 supra.
70. To reach this conclusion, the values given in Table 1 for R2, the square of the
multiple correlation coefficient, N, the average size for the sample, and k, the number
of usable independent variables, are substituted in the formula:
[R2/1-R2] . [ (N-k-l)/k] =F
SOCIAL STATISTICS 464-65. Turning to an F probability table, letting n1 = k and n2
N-k-i, reveals that either R2 appearing in Table 1 could have occurred purely by chance
less than one time in a thousand if the true value of R is 0. Id. at 465, 572. Even if N is
allowed to equal the smallest sample size appearing in columns 2 or 5 of Table 1, the F
probability table shows that either R2 could have occurred by chance less than five
times in a hundred. Id. at 570.
71. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
72. SoctAL STATISTICS 397-407, 466-67.
73. Id. at 464-65.
74. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
75. SOCIAL STATISrICS 293.
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would argue that the background characteristics of judges have a
zero correlation with their judicial decisions, although some do con-
tend that the correlation is low or, in some sense, not high enough.7 6
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS
The methodological purpose of this article has been to show some
of the things that can be done using multiple correlation techniques
to supplement non-multiple correlation techniques in analyzing the
relations between judicial background and attitudinal characteristics
and judicial decisions. In addition to this methodological purpose,
the article has further indicated the importance of political party as
a predictor of judicial propensities in criminal cases and, especially,
in cases involving economic conflict. 77 It has also indicated in the
multiple correlation context that the religious orientation of judges
is an important predictor of their decisional propensities in
criminal cases and their pre-judicial association with the business
world is an important predictor in economic cases.
Although judicial backgrounds may be useful in predicting those
judges or categories of judges who will be above or below the average
of their court on various types of decision scores78 (or at least those
scores associated with economic or criminal cases), judicial back-
ground variables are not as useful for predicting the outcomes of
cases in general. This is so largely because being above or below the
76. Grossman says: "Bowen's findings cast clear doubt on the explanatory power of
background variables taken by themselves." Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial
Decision-Making, 79 HAxv. L. REv. 1551, 1561 (1966) (footnote omitted). Murphy and
Tanenhaus quote Bowen as saying, "[T]he sociological background characteristics of these
judges . . .are generally not very helpful." W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF
PuBLIc LAw 107 (1972). In a paper summarizing his results, however, Bowen says:
[T]he predictive power of these variables [party, region, religion, prestige of schools
attended, age, and tenure] is generally quite low when they are taken by them-
selves ....
• . . [W]hen we take all six independent variables and examine their total
contribution the picture brightens considerably. The six sociological character-
istics together will explain anywhere from 20% to over 40% of the variance
in these cases. And to put the situation bluntly, explaining somewhere around
a quarter to better than a third of the variance is not, in current political
science, to be sneezed at.
D. Bowen, The Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior From Sociological Characteristics
of Judges 18-19 (undated) (unpublished paper available from Bowen or from this writer).
Bowen makes similar observations in his dissertation. D. Bowen, The Explanation of
Judicial Voting Behavior From Sociological Characteristics of Judges 19, 57 (unpublished
dissertation in Yale University Library, 1965).
77. For a list of other articles reaching this conclusion, see note 37 supra.
78. For a definition of decision score see note 14 supra.
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average of one's court is determined only by those cases in which
the judges on one's court differ, and such cases may only constitute
about 12 percent of the cases heard by the average state supreme
court.7 Even in those cases, one may be more interested in knowing
whether the plaintiff or the defendant will win and why than in know-
ing how the judges' votes will be split. To make such predictions re-
quires an analysis of the factual and legal variables present in the
cases used for the predictions and in the cases to be predicted; one or
more factual variables may relate to the dominant or plurality party,
religion, or pre-judicial occupation on the court.80
In spite of the limitations on judicial background analysis for
predictive purposes, such analysis does help improve the legal pro-
cess. It is useful for providing a better understanding of the de-
terminative factors in judicial decision-making. s' It also enables one to
demonstrate better the need for making judges more representative
of the people over whom they judge, since it enables one to show
that certain background characteristics have a substantial relation to
certain judicial propensities.8 2 Furthermore, if one finds a relatively
high correlation between the background characteristics of some
judges and their decisional propensities, then one can make state-
ments about methods of decreasing these correlations by analyzing
how low-correlation judges, or their courts, differ from high-correla-
tion judges.8 3 Finally, an analysis of these relations can provide some
79. One study found dissenting opinions in an average of 13% of the state supreme
court cases investigated. On particular supreme courts dissent was present in between
49% (New York) and 0% (Tennessee) of the cases. See Canon & Jaros, State Supreme
Courts-Some Comparative Data, 42 STATE GOVERNMENT 260, 264 (1969).
80. S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969), attempts to
discuss the legal process by focusing upon its legal, factual and personnel aspects rather
than by examining only the personnel aspect totally in isolation. See id. at 132-72.
81. For a good analysis of the causal role of background and attitudinal characteristics,
along with legal and factual elements, in determining one kind of judicial propensity,
see J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING As A HUMAN PROCESS (1971), especially 211-28, 341-82. In
comparing judges' sentencing patterns, however, Hogarth does not control for the nature
of the crimes or cases that the judges hear; some judges may hear more serious cases
and their doing so may correlate with their background characteristics. For example,
certain types of judges (e.g., female, older or Catholic judges) may hear or not hear a
disproportionate number of certain types of cases (e.g., rape, juvenile or abortion cases
respectively) because of their interest or because of the control counsel may exercise in
allocating the cases. These imbalances in case allocation may thereby make certain
judges appear to be more severe or lenient than their fellow judges.
82. See Nagel, Characteristics of Supreme Court Greatness, 56 A.BA.J. 957
(1970); Nagel, Unequal Party Representation on the State Supreme Courts, 45 J. AM. JuD.
Soc'y 62 (1961).
83. For example, appointed or long-tenured judges may have a lower correlation be-
tween their party affiliation and decisional propensities than elected or short-tenured
judges. See S. NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (1973).
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data that might be helpful to voters in the selection of judges and
to lawyers in the selection of jurors.84
Although this writer has tried to extend raw judicial background
analysis to these broader purposes, much remains to be done along
the lines suggested. It is hoped that the methods described here and in
materials cited in the footnotes will be applied to other courts, judges,
cases, countries and time periods to obtain more findings and to
build better theories for understanding and improving the legal
process.85
84. See id.; Nagel & Weitzman, Sex and the Unbiased Jury, 56 JUDICATURE 108 (1972).
85. A good recent example of the application of multiple correlation analysis to
judicial backgrounds and decisions is S. Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals Revisited (paper presented at the 1973 APSA annual meeting). Goldman's
paper contains a larger sample of judges than does Ulmer's recent Midwest Journal
study, supra note 58, but does not provide equally good control over the uniformity of
the cases heard by the judges.
